Waterfront Toronto — Sidewalk Labs Quayside Project Files (RFP, MIDP review)

Waterfront Toronto's official project repository for the Quayside / Sidewalk Labs partnership. Includes the original RFP, the MIDP, public consultation records, and the eventual termination correspondence.


Huawei Safe City — Marketing Whitepaper

Huawei's pitch deck for the 'Safe City' surveillance-camera + facial-recognition stack deployed in Belgrade, Nairobi, Kuala Lumpur, Bonn, and 100+ other cities. Lists the standard SKU bundle.


Cisco Kinetic for Cities — Vendor Reference Architecture

Cisco's smart-city data-aggregation platform. Marketing materials and technical architecture for the IoT-everywhere city deployment that Cisco sells to municipalities.


Belgrade Safe City — Huawei Contract Disclosure (SHARE Foundation)

Civil-liberties group SHARE Foundation's investigation into Belgrade's Huawei Safe City rollout. Contains the unredacted vendor contract, camera-placement maps, and procurement timeline.


EFF Atlas of Surveillance — National Database

Electronic Frontier Foundation maintains a city-level database of police surveillance tech: ALPRs, drones, body cams, ring partnerships, facial recognition, gunshot detection. Filter by city or technology.


EFF Atlas of Surveillance — Data Library (CSV exports)

Bulk CSV/JSON exports of the Atlas data. Useful when you want to answer questions like 'which cities deployed Clearview AI between 2020 and 2023'.


MuckRock — Surveillance Procurement FOIA Project

MuckRock's open-collaboration FOIA project tracking smart-city + surveillance contracts at the municipal level. Many of the contracts and emails uploaded came from individual journalist-filed FOIAs.


MuckRock — Stingray / Cell-Site Simulator FOIA Collection

Records from 100+ FOIA requests on local police use of cell-site simulators (Stingrays, Hailstorms). Vendor contracts (Harris Corp / L3Harris) and use logs.


ACLU — Community Control Over Police Surveillance (CCOPS) Model Bill

ACLU's model municipal legislation requiring city-council approval before police can buy surveillance tech. Adopted in 25+ cities; the policy lever for opposing top-down smart-city rollouts.


ACLU — Making Smart Decisions About Surveillance Report

ACLU's primer for city councils evaluating smart-city surveillance pitches. Includes a sample procurement-review checklist and case studies of botched deployments (Oakland, Seattle).


Brennan Center — Mass Surveillance Database

Brennan Center's index of federal-to-local surveillance partnerships, including DHS, FBI fusion centers, and DOJ grants funding city surveillance procurement.


Carlos Moreno — Introducing the '15-Minute City' (Smart Cities, 2021)

The peer-reviewed paper that coined and codified the '15-Minute City' framework. Moreno is a professor at IAE Paris and Special Envoy to the C40 Mayor of Paris. This is the academic origin of the policy concept.


Carlos Moreno — Author Page & Publications

Moreno's full publication list including the 30-minute territory, human-scale urbanism, and proximity-economy papers that feed the 15-min-city framework.


C40 Cities — Carlos Moreno 15-Minute City Q&A

C40's official explainer of the 15-Minute City model, co-authored with Moreno. The policy mechanism: rezone for mixed use, restrict private vehicle access, build sensor networks to enforce.


Strong Towns — Critique of Top-Down Smart-City Planning

Counter-narrative perspective. Strong Towns argues for organic, incremental urbanism over the WEF/C40 top-down smart-city model. Useful balance for evaluating any specific policy proposal.


Surveillance Studies Network — Surveillance Studies: An Overview

Academic primer on the surveillance-society framing. Bibliography of the field's primary literature (Lyon, Bauman, Zuboff) for anyone wanting the theoretical grounding.


WEF — Net Zero Carbon Cities Playbook

WEF's policy framework asking cities to combine net-zero targets with smart-city tech procurement. Bundles climate, surveillance, and 'mobility as a service' under one governance umbrella.


WEF — Future of the Connected World

Lays out the IoT-everywhere vision for cities: sensors, cameras, smart meters, biometric checkpoints — all under public-private 'governance partnerships' between cities, vendors, and the WEF itself.


WEF — Smart at Scale: Cities to Watch (25 Lighthouse Cities)

Identifies 25 'Lighthouse Cities' WEF is partnering with as pilots for the 4IR governance model. Names participating mayors, vendors, and technology stacks.


WEF — Governing Smart Cities Policy Benchmark

Compares 36 cities' policies on data, surveillance, AI ethics, and biometric tech. The benchmark methodology IS the policy push — what the WEF measures is what cities feel pressure to adopt.


WEF G20 Global Smart Cities Alliance — Roadmap

The G20-endorsed alliance coordinating 36 'pioneer cities' on shared policies for digital infrastructure, AI procurement, and citizen-data governance. Run jointly by WEF and the G20.


C40 Cities — 100 Mayors Climate Coalition Smart-City Framework

100-city coalition with joint WEF/Bloomberg/Rockefeller funding. Pushes climate-pegged smart-city policy including '15-minute city' urban-form mandates. Funder list is the policy lever.


ICLEI — Local Governments for Sustainability

Network of 2,500+ city/local governments coordinating smart-city + Agenda-2030 implementation. Less famous than C40 but bigger reach.


Sustainable Development Goals — SDG 11 Sustainable Cities

UN Sustainable Development Goal 11 is the policy umbrella under which smart-city investment is sold to municipalities. The targets and indicators are what city budgets must demonstrate progress on.


Sidewalk Labs — Master Innovation and Development Plan (Quayside)

1,500-page proposal for the Toronto Quayside smart-city redevelopment (2017–2020). Sidewalk Labs (Alphabet/Google subsidiary) withdrew in May 2020 after privacy / data-governance pushback. The MIDP is the canonical blueprint for a fully-instrumented urban district.


WEF — Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution Network Annual Report

WEF's flagship 4IR initiative report. The Centre coordinates the Global Smart Cities Alliance and 17 country-level affiliate centres advancing 4IR governance models in cities. Full corpus already mirrored in /wef-docs.


Shoshana Zuboff — The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (Background)

Harvard professor Zuboff's framing of smart-city data extraction as the urban frontier of surveillance capitalism. Required reading for the political-economy critique.


FLOCK NO — Volume 1 (peacepirates.org)

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================================================================================
              WHO'S READING YOUR LICENSE PLATES?
    ====================================================================
    [ FLOCK SAFETY + ALPR AWARENESS ]  :::  [ LEGAL + ACTIVIST ZINE ]
    ====================================================================
[ SYSTEM NOTICE: KNOWLEDGE IS POWER // FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IS A HUMAN RIGHT ]
// SYSTEM_MANIFEST // PAGE_00
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
This zine is for
education and civic engagement
.
                        It's about informed consent, oversight, and pushing for clear rules around
Automatic License Plate Recognition (ALPR)
deploymentsâspecifically systems
                        marketed under the guise of "Flock Safety."
NOT HACKING. NOT SABOTAGE. NOT "BREAKING INTO SYSTEMS."
We keep it lawful: public records, community organizing, research, voting, and policy advocacy.
                        Think of this as a
social engineering toolkit for democracy
.
                        The bureaucrats and vendors rely on obscurity and apathy.
We are denying them both.
// INTEL_BRIEF // PAGE_01
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ALPR systems are high-speed cameras that capture plate numbers, GPS locations, timestamps, and often photos of drivers/passengers. They build a massive, searchable database of civilian movement.
[ VULNS IN THE SYSTEM (POLICY-BASED) ]
[?] ACCESS CONTROL:
Who can access the data?
[?] DATA RETENTION:
How long is it retained?
[?] AUDIT TRAILS:
Is access audited?
[?] JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT:
Is there a warrant/court oversight model?
[?] DATA SHARING:
Is data shared across agencies or states?
[?] TRANSPARENCY:
Are there public reports and clear policies?
YOUR EXPLOIT:
Public comment periods, city council oversight, FOIA/public records requests, and local legislation. The vulnerability is their need for public consent.
// INTEL_NODES // PAGE_02
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[+] INDEPENDENT MEDIA & INVESTIGATIVE OUTLETS (CRITICAL NEW INTEL)
> 404 Media (Crucial Investigative Journalism on Flock)
Key Intel:
Exposed how Flock Safety coordinated with law enforcement to influence elected leaders, leaked live camera feeds, and revealed how ICE taps into Flock's nationwide network. They've also documented how Flock is used to track
people
, not just cars.
> GVWire (Local News Coverage - CA Context)
Key Intel:
Covers local ALPR debates and community resistance, including contract renewals and privacy concerns.
[+] DIRECT ACTION & COMMUNITY CAMPAIGNS
> Flip the Flock
(Grassroots Advocacy)
â¢ Main Site:
http://fliptheflock.org/
â¢ News:
http://fliptheflock.org/news
â¢ Social: @fliptheflock on Instagram
Key Intel:
Not affiliated with Flock Safety. They provide graphics, talking points, and track surveillance contracts pushed through "consent agendas" without public debate.
> DeFlock America
(Awareness & Organizing)
Part of the broader network educating drivers about risks and advocating for camera removal.
> NoCo Privacy Coalition
(Fort Collins, CO Example)
Successfully pushed back against Flock deployments. Model for local coalition building.
[+] MAPPING & TRACKING DEPLOYMENTS
> EFF Atlas of Surveillance (Crucial Mapping Tool)
> StopALPRs (Community Tracking)
> ALPR.watch (Agenda & Document Tracking)
[+] DEEP RESEARCH & ALTERNATIVE SITES
> EPIC ALPR Privacy Archive
> EFF DeepLinks (Tagged: License Plate Readers)
> MuckRock (THE tool for filing legal FOIAs)
> Lucy Parsons Labs (Surveillance FOIA archives)
> STOP (Surveillance Technology Oversight)
[+] BROADER TECH OVERSIGHT (Context is key)
> ACLU CCOPS Model Legislation
> Purge Palantir (Police tech accountability)
> PlatePrivacy (ALPR Info & Resources)
HOW TO USE:
Bookmark these. Map your city. Read the "what to ask" sections, then adapt the templates on Page 05 to your specific jurisdiction.
// AUDIT_PROTOCOL // PAGE_03
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Bring these to public meetings or drop them in written comments. Force them to answer on the record.
[01]
What vendor is involved, and what exact product/version is deployed?
[02]
What data is collected (plate only, or make/model/color/faces)?
[03]
Where is data stored, who hosts it, and is it encrypted at rest?
[04]
How long is data retained by default? (e.g., 30 days vs. indefinitely)
[05]
Who can query the system, and under what specific legal standard?
[06]
Are there independent, third-party audits? How often?
[07]
Is there a public transparency report (requests, hits, disclosures)?
[08]
Are there strict limits on use for non-criminal/civil purposes?
[09]
Is data shared with out-of-state or federal agencies (ICE, FBI, DEA)?
* Pro Tip: Cite the 404 Media investigation showing ICE uses Flock.
[10]
What complaint/appeal process exists for residents if misidentified?
// ACTION_VECTOR // PAGE_04
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Pick actions that match your time and risk tolerance. KEEP IT LAWFUL.
[*] WRITE A PUBLIC COMMENT (60-120 seconds)
Focus on oversight, retention limits, and the chilling effect on freedom of movement. Submit via email or at the mic.
[*] WEAPONIZE PUBLIC RECORDS (FOIA / State Open Records Laws)
Use MuckRock.com or your local county clerk. Request:
Contracts & vendor proposals (look for cost overruns)
Data retention policies
Camera placement maps (they often try to hide these)
Audit logs & compliance reports
Training materials for operators (shows intent)
Specifically ask for communications between Flock Safety reps and city officials/law enforcement (404 Media showed these exist and are coordinated).
[*] DEMAND A MORATORIUM
Ask city council to halt expansions until transparency safeguards, retention limits, and audit requirements are codified into law.
[*] DRAFT LOCAL LEGISLATION (The CCOPS Model)
Push for city ordinances requiring: 30-day maximum retention limits, warrant requirements for historical queries, ban on "dragnet" queries, and mandatory annual transparency reporting.
[*] COMMUNITY "KNOW YOUR RIGHTS" MEETINGS
Partner with local ACLU chapters or civil liberties groups. Bring printouts of camera locations from the EFF Atlas.
Use Flip the Flock's graphics and talking points.
[*] MEDIA OUTREACH
Journalists love public records. Get the docs, find the gaps, write an op-ed or tip off a local reporter.
Point journalists to 404 Media investigations as proof of national patterns and vendor misconduct.
[*] SUPPORT & AMPLIFY EXISTING CAMPAIGNS
Follow and share content from
Flip the Flock
and
DeFlock America
. Look into the
NoCo Privacy Coalition
's successful Colorado model.
// PAYLOAD_LIBRARY // PAGE_05
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
[A] PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST (Template - Enhanced)
[COPY PAYLOAD A]
To whom it may concern:

Under the [State] Public Records Law, I am requesting copies of all documents related to the City/County's Automatic License Plate Recognition (ALPR) system, including but not limited to:

1. All contracts and vendor proposals (including with Flock Safety).
2. Current data retention policies and standard operating procedures.
3. A map of all current and planned camera locations.
4. Any audit, compliance, or transparency reports generated since deployment.
5. Records of any data sharing agreements with external or federal agencies (including ICE, as reported by 404 Media).
6. All communications, emails, and text messages between city officials, law enforcement representatives, and Flock Safety representatives regarding the ALPR system's acquisition, deployment, or use.

I prefer to receive these records electronically. Thank you.
[B] CITY COUNCIL COMMENT (Short Template - Citing New Intel)
[COPY PAYLOAD B]
I am a resident of [City/District] and I am calling on the council to require strict transparency and oversight for any ALPR/plate reader systems, particularly Flock Safety.

Recent investigative reporting by 404 Media has revealed that Flock cameras have experienced data leaks, that their network is accessed by federal immigration enforcement (ICE), and that the company has coordinated with police to influence elected officials without public disclosure. These are not theoretical risks; they are documented failures of oversight and accountability.

Before any further expansion, we need publicly disclosed retention periods, access controls, audit procedures, and explicit data-sharing policies. I oppose any deployments that lack independent oversight or allow for untargeted "dragnet" surveillance of innocent residents. Show us the policy.
[C] NEIGHBORHOOD LEAFLET / GROUP CHAT TEXT
[COPY PAYLOAD C]
Heads up: There are ALPR cameras (Flock Safety) going up in our area. These track where you drive, when, and who you visit. Independent journalists at 404 Media have found serious problems: data leaks, ICE using the system to track people, and backroom deals to get them approved.

We deserve to know: How long is the data kept? Who has access? Is a warrant required? We need to see the contract and policy before this expands further.

Check out:
- 404 Media's investigations: https://www.404media.co/tag/flock
- Flip the Flock's campaign: http://fliptheflock.org/
- EFF's map of cameras: https://www.eff.org/atlas-of-surveillance
// WIN_STATE // PAGE_06
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Use these as your organizing baseline. Do not accept compromises that lack independent enforcement mechanisms.
[+] SHORT RETENTION LIMITS
Max 30 days, auto-purged.
[+] INDEPENDENT AUDITS
Annual, by an independent third party.
[+] ACCESS CONTROLS
Warrants for historical queries, mandatory logs for all access.
[+] TRANSPARENCY REPORTING
Published annually for the public.
[+] NO UNTARGETED DRAGNET QUERIES
No fishing expeditions allowed.
[+] PUBLIC NOTICE
Clear signage & published maps of camera locations.
[+] RESIDENT APPEAL PATHWAY
A way to challenge incorrect data/flags.
[+] VENDOR ACCOUNTABILITY
Contract clauses allowing termination for abuses.
[+] NO SHARING WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES WITHOUT LOCAL OVERSIGHT & WARRANTS
Direct response to ICE revelations exposed by 404 Media.
[+] BAN ON VENDOR-INITIATED CONTACT WITH ELECTED OFFICIALS
Direct response to 404 Media's findings regarding backroom influence lobbying.
================================================================================
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================================================================================
"The system only works if we are passive."
Read the links. Use the questions. Ask for the records. Show up. Speak up. Organize your block.
Special thanks to the investigative journalists at 404 Media and the grassroots campaigners at Flip the Flock for exposing the truth.
INFORMATION WANTS TO BE FREE. PUBLIC RECORDS ARE *YOUR* PROPERTY. GO GET THEM. BE LOUD. BE ACCURATE. STAY LEGAL.
[EOF] ::: FLOCK NO - ACTIVIST ZINE VOL 1 ::: KOPIMI - DATALOVE - SHARE & DISTRIBUTE FREELY

Summary: An activist e-zine on Flock Safety and automated license-plate readers (ALPR): what the cameras capture, how the 'share-to-search' network works, the legal and privacy concerns, and how ordinary people can audit or push back. Compiles reporting and resources from EFF, ACLU, EPIC, 404 Media and the DeFlock project.


Wisconsin ALPR cameras

Wisconsin (WI) has 10 mapped ALPR cameras — 10 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Reads every plate that passes

Infrared cameras capture the plate, location, date and time of every vehicle 24/7 — day or night, at up to 100 mph. Independent testing (IPVM, 2021) found roughly a 1-in-10 error rate, and misreads have caused wrongful stops (see below), so vendor accuracy claims are contested. Source: Flock Safety / IPVM. Date: 2021–2025.


'Vehicle Fingerprint' — finds you without a plate

Beyond the plate, Flock identifies vehicles by make, model, color, dents and damage, bumper stickers, roof racks, and aftermarket wheels — and its 'FreeForm' search takes natural language like 'white sports car with a racing stripe.' It can find a vehicle with no visible plate. Source: Consumer Rights Wiki / Flock. Date: 2026.


A nationwide search network

Flock runs a 'share-to-search' network: a department that shares its own data can search everyone else's — ~90,000+ cameras across ~7,000 networks. Over 75% of law-enforcement customers opt in; one 30-day audit logged 450,000+ nationwide searches, and single departments have queried thousands of other networks at once. Source: ACLU of Massachusetts / EFF. Date: 2025.


Data retention — and who really owns it

Default retention is 30 days with automatic deletion; up to a year requires approval from an elected body. Flock says 'the customer owns the data' — but its template contract grants Flock a 'worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free' license to share agency data for investigative purposes unless the department negotiates it out. Source: Flock / ACLU of Massachusetts. Date: 2025.


Nova — from license plate to a person's life

Leaked internal materials show 'Nova,' a data-fusion tool built to let officers 'jump from LPR to person' and link relatives/associates — supplementing plate data with data brokers, breach data, and public records across 20 toggleable sources. After 404 Media's report, Flock said it would drop known-breach data but kept the product. Source: 404 Media (Joseph Cox). Date: 2025-05-14.


Raven — microphones that now listen for 'distress'

Flock's Raven acoustic sensors flag gunshots using AI only (no human review, unlike ShotSpotter). A 2025 expansion added 'human distress' detection — the ad originally said 'screaming,' quietly amended after EFF's report. One oversight body found over 99% of gunshot alerts led to no police action. Source: EFF. Date: 2025-10-02.


Aerodome — drones that launch on a camera hit

Flock bought drone-as-first-responder company Aerodome (reported at over $300M) so an ALPR hit or a gunshot alert can auto-dispatch a drone; it later unveiled its own drone, 'Alpha.' Elk Grove PD (CA) got the first jurisdiction-wide FAA waiver to fly beyond line of sight. Source: TechCrunch. Date: 2024-10-23.


SignalTrace bolts phone/device trackers onto plate readers

The industry is now adding device tracking on top of the plate. In June 2026, 404 Media reported that Leonardo — the defense firm behind the ELSAG plate-reader line — markets 'SignalTrace,' which adds Bluetooth/Wi-Fi/RFID sensors to its readers to 'sweep up unique identifiers of mobile phones, wearables, and other Bluetooth-enabled devices,' then 'links devices that regularly travel together, correlating them to license plate.' Leonardo says it 'does not decrypt or read content.' The reporting is based on Leonardo's own product materials; no operational deployment has yet been documented — and this is an ELSAG product, NOT a Flock feature. Source: 404 Media (Joseph Cox) / Leonardo. Date: 2026.


…but modern phones randomize their MAC, limiting passive tracking

The device-tracking capability is real, but its reach against modern smartphones is genuinely contested. EFF's Surveillance Self-Defense notes that on current iOS and Android the Wi-Fi MAC in probe requests is randomized by default, 'which makes this kind of tracking much more difficult,' and footfall-analytics vendors report Wi-Fi capture fell to roughly 6–12% of passers-by after Apple and Google enabled it. The limit is not absolute: Bluetooth accessories, networks a phone actually joins, and cell identifiers (IMSI/IMEI) can still expose a stable ID, and randomization is 'software based… fallible.' Present the capability and the countermeasure together. Source: EFF Surveillance Self-Defense. Date: 2026.


Cell-site simulators ('Stingrays') make phones reveal IMSI/IMEI

A separate, older device-identifier tool is the cell-site simulator — sold under Harris/L3Harris brands (Stingray, Hailstorm, KingFish) and by vendors like KeyW and Boeing DRT ('dirtboxes'). It masquerades as a cell tower to trick nearby phones into transmitting the IMSI (subscriber ID) and IMEI (device ID). EFF and the ACLU have documented use across the FBI, DEA, ICE, U.S. Marshals and dozens of local departments; EFF says the devices 'invade the privacy of everyone who happens to be in a given area,' capturing identifiers from up to thousands of phones at once. Source: EFF Street-Level Surveillance. Date: 2026.


FreeForm — searching for people, not just cars

Flock's own product page for 'FreeForm' lets officers find people by plain-language description of 'clothing, visible accessories' and other 'observable, non-biometric visual characteristics' (e.g. 'man in blue shirt and cowboy hat'). Flock says FreeForm 'does not use facial recognition,' but it is a person-search over video. 404 Media documented departments using it to locate people — logged queries include a target's race and clothing — and a watchdog tally (HaveIBeenFlocked) counted 6,736 FreeForm searches across 121 agencies in 2025. That sits in tension with Flock's public FAQ that its cameras 'are not designed to search for people.' Source: Flock Safety / 404 Media. Date: 2026.


Condor — a camera that AI-follows and zooms on people

Flock's 'Condor' is a pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) camera with AI built to detect and follow human movement, streaming live to police — distinct from the fixed rear-plate 'Falcon' units. In a June 2026 demonstration filmed by InvestigateTV, a trail-mounted Condor pivoted, followed and zoomed in on a passing reporter in real time; asked 'You're saying Flock does not track people, correct?', the Flock representative said no, while the display showed the camera tracking the reporter. Source: InvestigateTV. Date: 2026.


Axon Lightpost — an ALPR + live-stream camera inside the streetlight

Axon's Lightpost (built with Ubicquia) clamps onto an existing streetlight and installs in under an hour — no new poles, trenching or permitting. It reads plates locally, uploads the LPR metadata to Axon Fusus for alerting and historical lookups, and lets authorized Fusus operators open a live video stream from the camera over its built-in LTE. Its sibling Axon Outpost is a fixed pole/wall camera with the same ALPR + vehicle-intelligence stack. Together they make roadside plate-and-video surveillance far cheaper to blanket across a city. Source: Axon / Ubicquia. Date: 2026.


Cities are dropping Flock — and hiring Axon to do the same job

A 2025–26 wave of cities cancelled Flock over its nationwide data-sharing network, then signed Axon to run license-plate cameras instead — Denver (council voted 7–6 for 50 Axon units, with 21-day retention, no vendor-run national database, and mandatory query audit trails), Syracuse (7–1), plus Pasco County FL and Bartlesville OK. Axon's pitch is that it has no nationwide cross-agency lookup — a real difference from Flock's ~90,000-camera share-to-search pool — but the cameras still capture every passing plate and feed Axon Fusus, so the switch narrows data-sharing without ending mass plate collection. Source: 404 Media / KDVR / Daily Orange. Date: 2026.


Flock Safety — vendor profile

The largest US operator: ALPR + video + gunshot audio + drones + the FlockOS platform. ~100,000+ cameras, ~5,000 agencies, ~$8.4B valuation (2026). National shared plate database: YES — its opt-in nationwide 'lookup' network is its distinguishing feature.


Motorola Solutions (Vigilant / DRN) — vendor profile

Runs Vigilant NVLS (20B+ reads, sold to police) and DRN (9B+ reads sold to repossession/insurance — a private data broker); L6Q solar quick-deploy cameras compete directly with Flock. National shared plate database: YES — two national databases, sold explicitly, including to the private sector.


Genetec AutoVu — vendor profile

Enterprise security platform (SharpV/SharpZ3 cameras); markets itself as the privacy-respecting anti-Flock; cloud or on-premises. National shared plate database: NO — it prevents cross-agency data pooling for local deployments.


Rekor Systems (Nasdaq: REKR) — vendor profile

Software (Rekor Scout) that runs ALPR on existing/standard cameras — no rip-and-replace hardware; roadway-intelligence focus. National shared plate database: NO — highway/roadway data, not a police-lookup network.


Axon — vendor profile

Fleet 3 in-car ALPR feeding Axon Evidence — plus, since 2026, two fixed cameras: Axon Outpost and Axon Lightpost (the latter built with Ubicquia to clamp onto an existing streetlight, installable in under an hour). Both do ALPR + live video streaming into Axon Fusus. Axon is actively displacing Flock (Denver, Syracuse, Pasco County FL, Bartlesville, Douglas County CO) via its body-cam lock-in. National shared plate database: NO — agency-controlled, no cross-agency national lookup (a difference officials cite when dropping Flock); but hits flow into Axon Fusus.


Leonardo / ELSAG — vendor profile

MPH-900 patrol-car mobile ALPR with real-time hotlist alerts; a long-standing law-enforcement vendor. Its parent, Leonardo, also markets SignalTrace — sensors that bolt Bluetooth/Wi-Fi/RFID device-identifier capture onto ELSAG plate readers (see capabilities). National shared plate database: NO — agency-owned hotlists.


Neology — vendor profile

Tolling and roadway RFID + ALPR (acquired 3M's ANPR/PIPS); vehicle ID for tolling, not policing. National shared plate database: NO — tolling infrastructure.


Jenoptik — vendor profile

European-rooted traffic-enforcement and tolling ALPR (VECTOR cameras) — speed/red-light/average-speed enforcement. National shared plate database: NO — fixed roadway enforcement.


Axon Fusus (real-time crime center) — vendor profile

A cloud 'real-time crime center' platform Axon acquired in 2024 (~$240M) that fuses ALPR hits, gunshot-detection alerts, body/in-car cameras, drones, dispatch data and public AND private security cameras into one map; its 'Core' device pulls privately-owned camera feeds into the police network for live access. Captures plates, faces-on-video and the real-time location of anyone in view of an enrolled camera. National shared plate database: NO — not one database but a network: EFF documents Fusus in 250+ agencies with 200,000+ enrolled cameras.


Clearview AI (facial recognition) — vendor profile

Built a face-search engine by scraping billions of photos from social media and public sites without consent (company has claimed 10B+, later 60B+ faceprints). Police upload a face photo and get matching images plus source links — biometric faceprints tied to online identities. Used by ICE and the FBI (see abuses); restricted by an Illinois biometric-privacy settlement (see lawsuits). National shared plate database: YES — a single scraped biometric database of billions of faceprints, searchable by law enforcement.


SoundThinking / ShotSpotter (acoustic gunshot detection) — vendor profile

Places microphones on poles and buildings across a coverage area; acoustic sensors plus human review classify sounds as gunfire and dispatch police to precise coordinates. Captures ambient audio and the location of suspected gunfire, and its output has been used as investigative evidence. Deployed in 160+ US cities historically — though many have dropped it (see abuses). National shared plate database: NO — a per-city sensor network, not a national database.


Fog Data Science — Fog Reveal (location-data broker) — vendor profile

A point-and-click web app that lets police search commercial smartphone-location data pulled from mobile advertising IDs across 700+ apps — draw an area to see every device that was there, or track one device's 'pattern of life' — often with no warrant, for roughly $6,000–$9,000/yr. An EFF/Associated Press investigation confirmed contracts or trials with at least 18 state and local agencies; records showed some agencies did not believe Carpenter v. U.S. required a warrant for app-derived location data. National shared plate database: YES (effectively) — Fog claimed access to 250M+ US devices and 15B location signals/day from the ad-tech marketplace.


BLIP Systems — BlipTrack (Bluetooth/Wi-Fi MAC sensors) — vendor profile

Danish vendor whose sensors record the Wi-Fi/Bluetooth MAC address of passing devices, then encrypt and time-stamp them to measure travel and dwell times. Documented at Schiphol, JFK, Dublin, Copenhagen and Brussels airports and on road networks in Stockholm and Auckland. Marketed as anonymized traffic analytics, not identity tracking. National shared plate database: NO — the vendor states MAC IDs are hashed for aggregate traffic-flow analytics.


Digitpol — MACGRAB (portable MAC-capture unit) — vendor profile

A vendor-announced (Dec 2023) 'portable Bluetooth and Wi-Fi MAC Address Capture Unit… for on-the-go collection of nearby WiFi and Bluetooth MAC addresses from passing devices,' streaming to a cloud with device profiles and MAC blacklists. Digitpol states it is 'an active surveillance device… exclusively available for purchase by Government Law Enforcement Agencies.' National shared plate database: NO — a portable capture unit with an operator-run cloud.


A Texas cop searched 83,000 cameras for a woman who had an abortion

An official at the Johnson County, TX Sheriff's Office ran two Flock searches for a woman who had a self-managed medication abortion (April–May 2025). The second reached 6,809 networks / 83,345 cameras nationwide — including states that protect abortion. The audit-log reason field read, verbatim, 'had an abortion, search for female.' The sheriff publicly called it a welfare check; court records later showed deputies had opened a 'death investigation of a non-viable fetus' and consulted the DA about charging her the same day as the search. Source: 404 Media / EFF. Date: May–Oct 2025.


ICE, CBP, Secret Service and the Navy got in through a side door

Local and state police ran 4,000+ Flock lookups for immigration purposes — reason fields literally reading 'ICE,' 'ICE WARRANT,' 'illegal immigration' — even though Flock has no ICE contract (records via Danville, IL). CBP separately had direct backend access to 80,000+ cameras through an undisclosed pilot; the Secret Service and Navy/NCIS also had access, and some departments did not know their data was being shared. Source: 404 Media (Koebler & Cox). Date: May–Oct 2025.


Illinois audits: illegal immigration searches + an undisclosed CBP pilot

Illinois law (Public Act 103-0540) bars using ALPR data for immigration or abortion enforcement. The Secretary of State's audit found 46 out-of-state agencies searched Illinois data illegally, that Mount Prospect's data was queried 262 times for immigration reasons, and — in a follow-up — that Flock had granted CBP access via an undisclosed pilot in violation of state law. Source: Illinois Secretary of State. Date: June–Sept 2025.


Officers stalking exes; searches with no case number

Documented cases show officers using Flock to stalk romantic interests — a Sedgwick, KS police chief searched his ex 164 times and her new boyfriend 64 times (228 searches). Audits found over 20% of Austin PD's ALPR searches had no case number, and in a dataset of 11.4 million Flock searches, 14%+ of the 'reason' fields were just the word 'investigation.' Source: Institute for Justice / Austin Chronicle / ACLU. Date: 2024–2026.


Flock cameras livestreaming to the open internet

At least 60 Flock 'Condor' cameras were streaming live to the open internet with no password — exposing live feeds, 30 days of archived video, and admin controls (a reporter filmed himself on a public feed). Device flaw CVE-2025-59403 is rated 9.8 (critical). Lawmakers asked the FTC why Flock doesn't enforce multi-factor authentication after stolen police logins were found for sale. Source: 404 Media / NIST NVD. Date: Sept–Dec 2025.


Innocent drivers stopped at gunpoint from misreads

The Institute for Justice documented at least 26 cases since 2018 of motorists wrongly detained — often at gunpoint — due to ALPR errors, most since 2023. A Flock one-letter misread in Sherwood, AR flagged a family's SUV as stolen; they were stopped at gunpoint with a ~6-week-old infant in the car. Comparable ALPR-error cases settled for $1.9M (Aurora, CO) and $495K (San Francisco). Source: Institute for Justice / EFF. Date: 2024–2026.


Jailed ~11 months on a ShotSpotter alert, then the case was dropped

Chicago resident Michael Williams (65) was arrested for a 2020 murder based largely on a ShotSpotter alert placing a 'gunshot' at an intersection. He spent nearly a year in jail — contracting COVID-19 twice — before Cook County prosecutors withdrew the ShotSpotter evidence and dismissed the case for lack of evidence. The MacArthur Justice Center litigated it as Williams v. City of Chicago; it became a leading example of an acoustic alert driving a wrongful arrest. Source: MacArthur Justice Center. Date: 2020–2022.


89% of Chicago ShotSpotter alerts found no gun crime; the city dropped it

A MacArthur Justice Center study of Chicago Police data (Jul 2019–Apr 2021) found 89% of ShotSpotter deployments turned up no gun crime and 86% led to no report of any crime — 40,000+ dead-end deployments, concentrated in Black and Latino neighborhoods; Chicago's Inspector General independently found the system rarely produced evidence of a gun crime. Chicago — long the flagship city — decommissioned ShotSpotter on Sept 22, 2024 after the mayor declined to renew, part of a wave that also included Dayton, Atlanta, San Antonio, Seattle and Buffalo. SoundThinking disputes the study's methodology and cites a 97% accuracy figure it has not substantiated in a peer-reviewed study. Source: MacArthur Justice Center / Chicago OIG / NPR. Date: 2021–2024.


Clearview face searches by ICE and the FBI — often via unvetted free trials

A BuzzFeed News review of a leaked Clearview client list found people at 2,228 agencies, companies and institutions had run nearly 500,000 face searches — including ICE (8,000+ searches from ~60 accounts) and the FBI (5,700+ across 20+ field offices), plus DOJ and CBP. Many ran through free trials individual officers activated with a government email, sometimes without their agency's knowledge or approval. ICE's largest reported purchase was a $3.75M Clearview contract. Source: BuzzFeed News (Ryan Mac et al.). Date: 2021.


Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)

Runs the Atlas of Surveillance and Street-Level Surveillance projects; with 404 Media, broke much of the documented oversight record. Its core critique: the danger is 'the architecture itself' — a nationwide interconnected network — 'not just how individual agencies use the technology.'


ACLU — 'Get the Flock Out'

Runs a national campaign; its foundational 2013 report 'You Are Being Tracked' first called ALPRs mass location tracking. Notes fewer than 1% of scanned cars are tied to any crime, and documented the 'perpetual, worldwide' data-sharing license in Flock's contracts.


DeFlock

A grassroots project founded in 2024 by software engineer Will Freeman (after noticing camera clusters around Huntsville, Alabama) that crowdsources ALPR camera locations into OpenStreetMap — the dataset behind the map on this page. When Flock sent a trademark cease-and-desist in Feb 2025, EFF represented Freeman and refused it.


Institute for Justice — Plate Privacy Project

Litigates ALPR dragnets as Fourth Amendment violations (Norfolk; San Jose) and compiles the running tallies of wrongful stops and officer stalking.


S.T.O.P. (Surveillance Technology Oversight Project)

Founded 2019 by Albert Fox Cahn; argues federal intelligence-sharing has let ICE 'sidestep sanctuary laws and co-opt local police databases and surveillance tools, including license plate readers.'


Sen. Wyden & Rep. Krishnamoorthi

Opened Congressional investigations and urged the FTC to act. Sen. Wyden: 'I now believe that abuses of your product are not only likely but inevitable.'


MacArthur Justice Center

A public-interest law firm (Northwestern Pritzker School of Law) that produced the leading empirical study of ShotSpotter in Chicago (89% of deployments found no gun crime) and litigates acoustic-surveillance harms, including Williams v. City of Chicago on behalf of a man wrongly jailed on a gunshot alert.


Schmidt v. City of Norfolk (E.D. Va. (No. 2:24-cv-00621) — summary judgment for the city Jan 27, 2026; on appeal at the 4th Circuit (No. 26-1227))

Institute for Justice Fourth Amendment challenge to Norfolk's 176-camera Flock dragnet (one plaintiff's car captured 475 times in ~4.5 months). ACLU, EFF, EPIC, Cato and NCLA filed amici for the plaintiffs; the DOJ filed for Norfolk. Status: unverified.


Tan v. City of San Jose (N.D. Cal. — filed April 2026)

Institute for Justice federal class action challenging San Jose's 474 Flock cameras (which recorded ~360M images in 2024; ~0.25% matched a hotlist) as a warrantless Fourth Amendment search. Status: unverified.


SIREN v. City of San Jose (Santa Clara County Superior Court — filed Nov 2025)

EFF + ACLU of Northern California suit under the California Constitution, alleging 261,711 warrantless database searches in one year (~692/day).


Javorsky v. Flock Group, Inc. (N.D. Cal. (No. 3:26-cv-02382) — filed Feb 2026)

Class action against Flock itself under California's ALPR Privacy Act (SB 34), seeking statutory damages of at least $2,500 per violation; alleges out-of-state agencies searched SFPD's Flock data over 1.6M times in seven months.


Chatrie v. United States (SCOTUS) (U.S. Supreme Court — June 29, 2026 (6–3))

A geofence-warrant case (not ALPR), but the Court held such a search implicates the Fourth Amendment and rejected the government's 'small slice of a big database' argument — reasoning that undercuts the Norfolk district-court rationale and strengthens Schmidt's appeal.


ACLU v. Clearview AI (Illinois BIPA) (Illinois Circuit Court, Cook County — settled 2022)

ACLU suit under Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). The 2022 settlement permanently bars Clearview, nationwide, from selling or giving its faceprint database to most private entities, bars access to any Illinois state/local government body (including police) for five years, and requires an opt-out for Illinois residents. A separate $51.75M federal class-action settlement giving class members a ~23% equity stake in Clearview was approved in 2025.


Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Department (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (en banc), June 24, 2021)

The Fourth Circuit, en banc, ruled Baltimore's 'Aerial Investigation Research' program — run by private contractor Persistent Surveillance Systems, whose camera planes captured ~12 hours/day of movement across ~90% of the city — an unconstitutional warrantless search under Carpenter v. U.S., likening it to putting 'an ankle monitor on every person in the city.' A settlement bars Baltimore from running a similar program.


State of Maryland v. Kerron Andrews (Maryland Court of Special Appeals (2016), affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland (2017))

The first U.S. appellate ruling that using a cell-site simulator is a Fourth Amendment search ordinarily requiring a warrant. Baltimore Police used a 'Hailstorm' device without a warrant to force Andrews's phone to reveal its location inside a private home; the courts upheld suppression of the resulting evidence.


Austin, TX

Let its Flock pilot lapse June 30, 2025 over ICE/data-sharing risk (an audit had found 20%+ of searches with no case number).


Sedona, AZ

Unanimously terminated Sept 9, 2025 (11 cameras removed) after Flock admitted CBP access days after saying there was none.


Oak Park & Evanston, IL

Both terminated (Aug 2025) after Illinois audits found immigration-tagged out-of-state searches; Evanston issued a cease-and-desist when Flock re-installed removed cameras.


Mountain View, CA

Unanimously terminated Feb 24, 2026 (30 cameras) after an audit found 'National/Statewide Lookup' on from the start and ATF + an Air Force base had accessed its data.


Denver, CO

Let its contract expire March 31, 2026 (~110 cameras removed) over federal-immigration sharing; switched vendors. Mayor: 'We've heard the community loud and clear.'


Santa Cruz, Los Altos Hills, Oxnard, South Pasadena, San Francisco, Fort Collins…

A wave of 2026 cancellations, mostly over unauthorized federal/ICE access. Trackers count anywhere from ~30 (NPR, Feb 2026) to 53–82 (mid-2026) localities — the number keeps climbing.


Illinois — Public Act 103-0540 (625 ILCS 5/2-130)

Bars sharing ALPR data to enforce abortion or immigration law and requires a written declaration from any out-of-state agency before sharing (effective Jan 1, 2024). The Secretary of State used it to order CBP access shut off in 2025.


California — S.B. 34 (2015)

Bars public agencies from selling/sharing ALPR data except with other public agencies; creates a private right of action with $2,500 minimum damages. AG Bonta's 2023 bulletin declared out-of-state/federal sharing unlawful.


Virginia — HB 2724 (2025)

Virginia's first comprehensive ALPR statute (effective July 1, 2025): a 21-day retention limit, enumerated permitted uses, and annual reporting. The Governor's proposed 30-day extension was rejected.


Washington — SB 6002 'Driver Privacy Act' (2026)

Signed March 30, 2026: 21-day retention, prohibits ALPR use for immigration enforcement and reproductive/gender-affirming-care investigations, and bars collection near sensitive locations; willful violations are gross misdemeanors.


Flock's crime-solving figures

Flock Safety says its cameras help solve 'over 700,000 crimes each year' and supported 'more than 1 million criminal investigations' in 2025. Its headline 'share of crime solved' figure, though, is not a stable or comparable number: it moved from 2.5% (2022) to 10% (2024) to 20% (2026), and the base quietly shifted from 'reported crime' to 'solved/cleared cases.' Both the 700,000 and the 10% figures come from Flock-commissioned surveys, not government data — treat them as the company's own claims. Source: Flock Safety (2025 Impact Census).


Documented cases where the cameras worked

Beyond the vendor claims are specific, independently-reported cases. Boulder (CO) police credited a Flock camera with locating a 16-year-old AMBER-alert victim within minutes ('without this technology, we would send this information out statewide'); a kidnapped 1-year-old was recovered across state lines in Arizona after a Flock hit; and departments in Whiteville NC, Virginia Beach VA, El Cajon CA and Bluffton SC have credited ALPR hits with homicide arrests within hours. Source: Denver7 / AZFamily / local police.


The courts have — so far — upheld the cameras

In Schmidt v. City of Norfolk (Jan 27, 2026) a federal judge granted summary judgment for the city, holding Norfolk's ALPR system does not 'track the whole of a person's movements' — but expressly hedged, 'at least in Norfolk, Virginia, the answer is: not today,' warning it could become too intrusive as coverage grows; it is on appeal at the Fourth Circuit. Other rulings agree a plate 'in plain view' carries no reasonable expectation of privacy (Commonwealth v. Church, VA; Bednarz v. Illinois State Police; U.S. v. Yang, 9th Cir.). Source: WHRO / court opinions.


Flock's 'public safety by design' argument

Flock argues ALPRs 'observe vehicles, not people,' that 'license plates are public by design,' and that its cameras create 'discrete, point-in-time observations… rather than an always-on dossier,' with 30-day default retention, hard deletion, encryption, and an audit trail of every search reason. Police groups like the IACP treat ALPR as legitimate when queries are tied to a case number, run by trained users, and audited. Source: Flock Safety / IACP.


Much of the recent opposition is explicitly about immigration

A large share of the 2025–26 wave of city cancellations is openly driven by immigration/ICE concerns, not general privacy. One tracker summary found cancellations 'cluster around three themes: immigration enforcement fears, unauthorized federal access, and a collapse of trust.' Officials say so directly — a Santa Cruz councilmember tied her vote to an ICE killing and 'our Santa Cruz values,' and the EFF titled an op-ed 'San Jose Can Protect Immigrants by Ending Flock Surveillance.' (No source publishes a clean number for how many cancellations cite ICE vs. privacy — it's a documented pattern, not a tallied count.) Source: TechTimes / NPR / EFF.


Why the immigration numbers carry a political stake

Non-citizens — including illegal immigrants — count in the decennial Census, which determines congressional apportionment (House seats), Electoral College shares, and the distribution of more than $2.8 trillion/yr in federal funding. Because that population concentrates in certain jurisdictions, there is a real, documented representation-and-funding stake tied to it — which is why some Republicans (the Hagerty/Cassidy bills) have moved to exclude illegal immigrants from the apportionment count. Source: U.S. Census Bureau / Urban Institute / Sen. Hagerty.


…but the partisan size of that effect is contested

How much this actually shifts power is disputed — and generally found small. PolitiFact rated FALSE the claim that counting non-citizens gave Democrats '24 more seats,' estimating real shifts of ~2–3 seats. Pew found that excluding unauthorized immigrants would cost California, Florida and Texas a seat each — and Florida and Texas are Republican-leaning. From 2019–2023, far more non-citizens moved to red states (~1.2 million) than blue states (~72,000). So the incentive is real, but the measured partisan effect is modest and not cleanly one-sided. Source: PolitiFact / Pew Research / Third Way.


Is the opposition politically motivated? (an argument that is made)

Some argue the privacy objection is selectively invoked and really tracks immigration enforcement. Pierce County (WA) Sheriff Keith Swank put it bluntly: 'Outrage over privacy and surveillance spikes the moment the tools start identifying illegal aliens who commit crimes… activists who stayed silent about other monitoring suddenly discover deep concerns for civil liberties when the targets are people in the country illegally.' The broader version ties opposition to the census/representation stake above. This is presented as an argument that is made — not as an established fact. Source: Seattle Red (Sheriff Keith Swank, Jul 2026).


What the opponents say their motive is

Opponents frame it as a universal, cross-partisan objection to warrantless mass tracking of everyone. The ACLU's Jay Stanley calls Flock 'a giant nationwide warrantless surveillance infrastructure' and stresses the data 'can be abused not just by ICE, and not just for immigration purposes' — pointing to the Texas officer who searched nationwide for a woman who'd had an abortion and to police running searches around protests. Some opponents do openly name protecting immigrants as one aim — but that is a declared policy position, which is different from a hidden partisan motive. Source: ACLU (Jay Stanley) / EFF.


The opposition is not only left-wing

A purely partisan read of the opposition is incomplete. The same Norfolk lawsuit is backed from both ends of the spectrum: the libertarian Institute for Justice brings it, and the libertarian Cato Institute AND the progressive ACLU/EFF each filed for the plaintiffs. Cato frames ALPRs as 'suspicionless searches that the Framers sought to prohibit,' tracing them to the 1761 writs-of-assistance fight. Red jurisdictions have dropped Flock — Sedona AZ, and the Texas towns of Bandera ('Self-governance starts at home. It's your duty to defend our constitutional rights') and Lockhart — and Republican legislators (Rep. Keith Self, R-TX) plus GOP-led Arkansas, Idaho and Montana have restricted ALPRs on Fourth-Amendment grounds. Source: Reason / Cato / Bandera Bulletin.


Does Flock's own camera capture your phone's MAC address?

Short answer from the record: not that anyone has documented. The confusion is understandable — anti-surveillance detectors ('Flock You' / DeFlock) locate Flock cameras by picking up the cameras' OWN emissions: Flock units broadcast a Wi-Fi SSID of the form 'Flock-[partial MAC]' plus Bluetooth beacons, which the detectors read to find them. That is people detecting the camera, not the camera capturing your device. The vendor with documented device-identifier capture is Leonardo/ELSAG's SignalTrace, which runs on ELSAG's own readers and does not integrate with Flock. So: device-MAC capture is a real, documented ALPR-industry capability — but it is not established for Flock's own cameras. 'Not documented' is not the same as 'impossible'; it is simply where the public record stands today. Source: Flock You detector docs (VirtuallyScott) / Leonardo.


Total US ALPR cameras mapped

There are 136,950 automated license plate reader (ALPR) cameras mapped across the United States in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset. This is a sample, NOT a complete registry — real deployments are higher.


ALPR cameras by manufacturer

Mapped ALPR cameras by manufacturer/brand: Flock Safety 111,668, Motorola Solutions 6,935, Other 4,225, Genetec 3,370, Axis Communications 1,701, Leonardo/ELSAG 1,170, Rekor 705, Neology 561 (of 136,950 total). Flock Safety is by far the largest operator.


States with the most ALPR cameras

The US states with the MOST mapped ALPR cameras, ranked highest to lowest (crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock): California 21,323, Texas 15,477, Georgia 10,036, Illinois 9,468, Florida 8,881, Ohio 6,111, Michigan 5,576, North Carolina 4,839, New Jersey 4,367, Indiana 4,310, Alabama 4,259, New York 3,412, Louisiana 2,780, Kansas 2,767, Colorado 2,703. Flock Safety is the dominant brand in nearly every state.


California ALPR cameras

California (CA) has 21,323 mapped ALPR cameras — 17,044 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Texas ALPR cameras

Texas (TX) has 15,477 mapped ALPR cameras — 14,205 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Georgia ALPR cameras

Georgia (GA) has 10,036 mapped ALPR cameras — 9,273 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Illinois ALPR cameras

Illinois (IL) has 9,468 mapped ALPR cameras — 7,362 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Florida ALPR cameras

Florida (FL) has 8,881 mapped ALPR cameras — 6,992 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Ohio ALPR cameras

Ohio (OH) has 6,111 mapped ALPR cameras — 5,496 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Michigan ALPR cameras

Michigan (MI) has 5,576 mapped ALPR cameras — 4,764 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


North Carolina ALPR cameras

North Carolina (NC) has 4,839 mapped ALPR cameras — 4,287 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


New Jersey ALPR cameras

New Jersey (NJ) has 4,367 mapped ALPR cameras — 1,613 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Indiana ALPR cameras

Indiana (IN) has 4,310 mapped ALPR cameras — 4,076 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Alabama ALPR cameras

Alabama (AL) has 4,259 mapped ALPR cameras — 3,627 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


New York ALPR cameras

New York (NY) has 3,412 mapped ALPR cameras — 2,071 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Louisiana ALPR cameras

Louisiana (LA) has 2,780 mapped ALPR cameras — 2,240 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Kansas ALPR cameras

Kansas (KS) has 2,767 mapped ALPR cameras — 1,568 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Colorado ALPR cameras

Colorado (CO) has 2,703 mapped ALPR cameras — 2,343 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Arizona ALPR cameras

Arizona (AZ) has 2,644 mapped ALPR cameras — 2,187 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Virginia ALPR cameras

Virginia (VA) has 2,430 mapped ALPR cameras — 2,256 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Arkansas ALPR cameras

Arkansas (AR) has 2,188 mapped ALPR cameras — 2,028 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Washington ALPR cameras

Washington (WA) has 2,005 mapped ALPR cameras — 1,732 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Minnesota ALPR cameras

Minnesota (MN) has 1,967 mapped ALPR cameras — 1,721 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Pennsylvania ALPR cameras

Pennsylvania (PA) has 1,839 mapped ALPR cameras — 572 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Maryland ALPR cameras

Maryland (MD) has 1,711 mapped ALPR cameras — 1,414 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Oklahoma ALPR cameras

Oklahoma (OK) has 1,672 mapped ALPR cameras — 1,481 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Kentucky ALPR cameras

Kentucky (KY) has 1,543 mapped ALPR cameras — 1,408 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Massachusetts ALPR cameras

Massachusetts (MA) has 1,491 mapped ALPR cameras — 1,252 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Tennessee ALPR cameras

Tennessee (TN) has 1,467 mapped ALPR cameras — 1,289 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Missouri ALPR cameras

Missouri (MO) has 1,373 mapped ALPR cameras — 1,211 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


New Mexico ALPR cameras

New Mexico (NM) has 1,325 mapped ALPR cameras — 932 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Connecticut ALPR cameras

Connecticut (CT) has 1,279 mapped ALPR cameras — 766 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Utah ALPR cameras

Utah (UT) has 1,063 mapped ALPR cameras — 832 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Iowa ALPR cameras

Iowa (IA) has 998 mapped ALPR cameras — 818 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Delaware ALPR cameras

Delaware (DE) has 765 mapped ALPR cameras — 525 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Oregon ALPR cameras

Oregon (OR) has 759 mapped ALPR cameras — 564 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Idaho ALPR cameras

Idaho (ID) has 531 mapped ALPR cameras — 416 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


South Carolina ALPR cameras

South Carolina (SC) has 392 mapped ALPR cameras — 359 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


District of Columbia ALPR cameras

District of Columbia (DC) has 325 mapped ALPR cameras — 296 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Nebraska ALPR cameras

Nebraska (NE) has 308 mapped ALPR cameras — 253 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Mississippi ALPR cameras

Mississippi (MS) has 181 mapped ALPR cameras — 166 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Maine ALPR cameras

Maine (ME) has 92 mapped ALPR cameras — 48 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Wyoming ALPR cameras

Wyoming (WY) has 67 mapped ALPR cameras — 62 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


North Dakota ALPR cameras

North Dakota (ND) has 54 mapped ALPR cameras — 15 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


South Dakota ALPR cameras

South Dakota (SD) has 48 mapped ALPR cameras — 36 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


West Virginia ALPR cameras

West Virginia (WV) has 46 mapped ALPR cameras — 36 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


New Hampshire ALPR cameras

New Hampshire (NH) has 41 mapped ALPR cameras — 4 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Montana ALPR cameras

Montana (MT) has 34 mapped ALPR cameras — 28 of them Flock Safety in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).


Nevada ALPR cameras

Nevada (NV) has 3 mapped ALPR cameras in the crowdsourced OpenStreetMap/DeFlock dataset (a sample, not a complete count).